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10 Increases in standard hours of work have been a contentious policy issue in Germany. 
Whilst this might directly lead to a substitution of workers by hours, there may also be a 
positive employment effect due to reduced costs. Moreover, the response of firms may 
differ between firms that offer overtime and those that do not. For a panel of German 
plants (2001–2006) drawn from the IAB Establishment Panel, we are the first 
15 to analyse the effect of increased standard hours on employment. Using difference- 
in-difference methods we find that, consistent with theory, overtime plants showed a 
significant positive employment response, whilst for standard-time plants there is no 
difference between plants that increased standard hours and those that did not. There is 
clear evidence of wage concession in all treated plants. 
20 JEL classifications: J20, J30, C23. 
1. Introduction 
Work sharing was an important and contentious policy issue in Europe in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The policy stems from the belief that a reduction in working 25 time 
could increase employment, based on the idea that a fixed amount of worker -hours 
can be spread amongst a larger number of workers. The basic policy tool was to 
change ‘standard hours’, the stipulated weekly working time excluding overtime. 1 
More recently, in Germany in the early 2000s, the policy debate went into reverse. 
As firms became relatively more powerful, many increased standard 30 hours 
because it lowers labour costs when overtime wage rates are at a premium. In this 
article we examine the effect of this policy on employment. In the earlier work -
sharing literature, the canonical labour demand model was used to examine 
1Synonyms for standard hours are normal working time, standard working time, normal hours and the 
standard workweek. 
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whether cutting standard hours did, in fact, increase employment. For the policy 
discussed here, it is tempting to argue that the effects should be in the opposite 
direction to that predicted by cutting standard hours. To see this, suppose that 
standard hours increase and assume that the hourly wage rate is fixed. This 
5 decreases the marginal cost of employment—because a smaller fraction of the 
costs per employee has to be compensated at a premium overtime rate—but 
leaves the marginal cost of an hour unchanged. Hence, there is a substitution 
effect, from hours towards employment. However, many workers do not work 
overtime. If firms choose weekly hours at exactly the standard workweek, an 
10 increase in standard hours will necessarily decrease employment for a given level 
of output. No matter whether firms offer overtime, there is an additional scale 
effect whereby the decrease in costs leads to more output and more employee-
hours. Thus, at worst, the employment effect of increasing standard hours is 
ambiguous and even then only for firms that do not offer overtime. At best,  
15 employment will increase. 
However, there are good reasons that assuming symmetry might be misleading 
once we allow for the possibility that hourly wage rates will be re-negotiated in 
response to changes in standard hours. For cuts in standard hours, it is often 
assumed that the hourly wage rate is negotiated upwards so as to keep workers’ 
20 weekly income unchanged. This is labelled ‘(full) wage compensation’ in the work-
sharing literature, and is another reason for thinking that work sharing will not lead 
to favourable employment effects.
2
 In the case of increasing standard hours, 
workers may accept decreases in their hourly wage that leaves their weekly wage 
unchanged. We label this ‘(full) wage concession’. It remains an open question 
25 whether workers accept wage concessions, so an analysis of firms’ labour costs is an 
important part of any empirical analysis. 
A second reason that assuming symmetry might be misleading is because the 
policy context is different. In Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, standard hours fell 
because of a tripartite agreement between unions, firms, and the state; in the early 
30 2000s, the increases in standard hours have been driven mostly by firms on their own. 
A third reason for not assuming symmetry is simply that the firm’s hiring and firing 
costs are asymmetric: firing a worker can be more expensive than hiring one. 
At the turn of the century Western Germany had one of the shortest standard 
workweeks in the OECD.
3
 The economic environment changed in the early 2000s, 
35 when some firms reversed recent trends and increased standard hours. Well-
publicized examples included Siemens, Daimler-Chrysler, and Volkswagen. The 
European Economic Advisory Group (2005, p.56) (EEAG) notes that these 
increases in standard weekly hours were introduced to reduce labour costs in 
response to increased competitive pressures; such increases were agreed at the 
2 Wage compensation is when the hourly wage rate increases, but weekly income falls; it is ‘full’ when 
weekly income stays the same. 
3 See Carley (2004). Average collectively agreed standard hours in Western Germany in 2003 was 37.4, 
compared to an EU-15 average of 38.1. 
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company rather than the sectoral level. At the time, many commentators interpreted 
these changes as arising from increasingly powerful firms in firm–union 
negotiations and/or firms responding to increasing competition because of global-
ization. There was less consensus as to whether employment and output would 
5 increase.
4
 Moreover, to date there has been no econometric evidence.
5
 
Our article is the first that estimates the effect of this increase in standard hours 
on employment. We analyse a sample of German plants from 2001 to 2006, and we 
use both standard regression and propensity score matching in a difference-in-
differences (DiD) framework. We compare those plants that increased standard 
10 hours between 2002 and 2004 (the treatment group) with plants for whom standard 
hours did not change between 2001 and 2006 (the control group). The data are an 
annual panel of plants collected by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt– und 
Berufsforschung, and cover 1% of all plants in Germany (the IAB Establishment 
Panel). 
15  To interpret our results as a causal impact of standard hours on employment, 
two standard key identifying assumptions are required (see, for example, Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009, ch. 5). The first is that plants do not respond to a demand shock by 
immediately increasing standard hours; if they did, then the covariate of interest, the 
treatment dummy, would be correlated with part of the regression error, the 
20 unobserved demand shock. We argue that the first assumption is valid because 
changes in standard hours typically require negotiation with workers or their rep-
resentatives, and this takes time. Instead, the short-term response to changes in 
demand is to change employment or overtime. Note that pre-existing differences in 
demand between plants that increase their standard hours are unproblematic 
25 because of the DiD methodology we use. In addition, temporary shocks to demand are 
also unproblematic because even if plants did adjust standard hours in response 
(which we do not believe for reasons already given), this adjustment would be 
reversed once the temporary shock ends. This is because our definition of treated 
plants excludes plants that make temporary changes to standard hours. The 
30 second assumption is that employment trends would have been the same in both 
treated and control plants in the absence of treatment. To test this assumption we 
compare employment trends in treated and control plants before increases in 
standard hours occur. 
4In summarizing the extensive public debate, the EEAG notes that it diverges ‘fundamentally’ between 
those who believe that increased working hours will increase employment (e.g. Sinn, 2003) and those 
who believe the opposite. Furthermore, Dustmann et al. (2014) attribute much of Germany’s improved 
macro performance since the early 2000s to the unprecedented decentralization of the wage-setting 
process from the industry level to the firm level. 
5Using the growing empirical literature on work sharing is not directly relevant here, because, as already 
noted, we cannot assume symmetry. This literature examines the effects of cutting standard hours on 
employment and wages, using firm, worker, and industry data for France, Germany, Portugal, and 
Canada. We note that there is very little evidence for positive employment effects and most studies find 
evidence of wage compensation. See Hunt (1999), Crépon and Kramarz (2002), Andrews et al. (2005), 
Schank (2006), Skuterud (2007), Esteväo and Sá(2008), Chemin and Wasmer (2009), and Raposo and 
van Ours (2010). 
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As outlined already, the standard theory of the firm suggests that the response of 
plants to a change in standard hours will differ between those that offer overtime 
and those that do not. We therefore stratify our sample accordingly. It is important 
to note that in some cases plants that increased standard hours offered 
5  ‘employment guarantees’ to their existing workforce. It is therefore useful to 
consider both the hiring and separation response to changes in standard hours, 
since firms who offered employment guarantees, and who wanted to reduce 
employment, could still reduce hiring. Finally, we run the same DiD regressions, 
but with the plant’s per worker labour costs as the dependent variable, so we can 
10 examine whether concessions in the hourly wage rate occurred. 
In Section 2, we provide more details on the institutional background. In Section 
3, we outline an established theoretical model for assessing whether more 
employment follows from increases in standard hours and whether wage conces-
sions occur. In Section 4, we describe the data; in Section 5 we discuss our DiD 
15 methodology; and in Section 6 we discuss our results. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Institutional background 
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in standard hours in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s 
and suggests that standard hours have remained roughly constant in Western 
Germany since 1998 and in Eastern Germany since 2002.
6
 However, Fig. 1 refers 
20 only to standard hours covered by bargaining agreements. Figure 2 uses the IAB 
establishment panel to show the trend in standard hours for all plants, not just those 
with bargaining agreements.
7
 Figure 2 shows that the majority of plants do not 
have bargaining agreements, and since the turn of the century, standard hours have 
been increasing in Western German plants, and in particular in those plants 
25 which have no bargaining agreements. The workweek is about 1 hour longer in 
Western Germany and about 30 minutes longer in Eastern Germany when standard 
hours are not determined by collective bargaining. 
The key features of the increase in working time in the early 2000s are as follows.
8
 It 
is argued that agreements to lengthen standard hours were an attempt to reduce 
30 labour costs in the face of increased competition and came about at the company rather 
than sectoral level.
9
 In addition to Siemens, Daimler-Chrysler, and Volkswagen, 
other well-publicized agreements were negotiated at Deutsche Bahn, MAN, Thomas 
Cook, Lufthansa, and many other small and medium-sized firms. In addition, state 
governments increased working time for civil servants in Bavaria and 
6 Source: Tarifregister of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit. Received on personal 
request from the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS). 
7 In this section, we refer to both firms and plants, because the IAB Establishment Panel is not a firm-
level data set. In Section 3 we refer only to firms. 
8 See Section 2 of the European Economic Advisory Group (2005) for fuller details. 
9According to European Economic Advisory Group (2005, p.56), employees were ‘exposed to credible 
threats from employers that production sites will be closed down and jobs outsourced abroad’. 
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Fig. 1 Standard hours determined by collective bargaining. Source: 
Tarifregister of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit. 
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 
1 9 9 6  1 9 9 8  2 0 0 0  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 6  
None (50.4% of plants, 30.4% of workers) 
Industry (44.8% of plants, 60.8% of workers) 
Firm (4.9% of plants, 8.8% of workers) 
1 9 9 6  1 9 9 8  2 0 0 0  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 6  
None (71.1% of plants, 78.7% of workers) 
Industry (21.4% of plants, 38.1% of workers) 
Firm (7.5% of plants, 13.3% of workers) 
Fig. 2 Standard hours at the plant level, by bargaining agreement, weighted 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel. 
Hessen. In some notable cases—for example, Siemens, Daimler-Chrysler, and 
Volkswagen—some form of employment guarantee from the employer was agreed. 
For those plants involved in sectoral bargaining, so-called opening clauses in 
bargaining agreements allowed plants to deviate from the standard hours 5 
originally negotiated. In the 2005 Wave of the IAB Establishment Panel, 13% of  
4 0 . 5  
4 0 . 0  
3 9 . 5  
3 9 . 0  
3 8 . 5  
3 8 . 0  
3 7 . 5  
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plants had such opening clauses, and of these, 52% actually made use of them. 
Opening clauses were used mostly for making standard hours adjustments. 
Furthermore, many of the agreements did not involve any compensation in weekly 
pay, thereby lowering pay per hour. 
5  The employment guarantees mentioned above are a reason employment reductions 
in response to increased standard hours might not be observed in the short run. 
However, employment guarantees to existing employees do not prevent firms 
lowering employment, since firms are still able to reduce hiring (Abowd et al., 1999). 
3. Theoretical considerations 
10 We start with the neoclassical demand for hours model to illustrate whether an 
increase in standard hours leads to lower employment. We extend such a model of 
labour demand by modelling the firm’s choice of overtime regime. This draws 
heavily on Leslie (1984), Hart (1987), Calmfors and Hoel (1988), as well as 
Andrews et al. (2005) and references within. We then discuss what happens 
15 when we extend the model to a union-firm bargaining framework. 
3.1 The theory of the firm 
Consider a firm free to choose both the level of employment, N, and weekly hours, 
H, per employee. All workers work the same number of hours. The firm’s cost 
function is given by 
C = N(wH ± z) if H = H; (1) 
2 0  
C = N[wH ± yw(H — H) ± z] if H > H. (2) 
We assume that the firm does not offer its employees hours of work lower than the 
standard workweek, because short-time working is not observed very often in the 
sample period (part-time working is usually seen as a supply-side phenomenon). 
25 Weekly hours may be greater than the standard workweek, in which case overtime 
hours V . H — H are strictly positive. Each hour up to H is paid w; overtime hours 
are paid at premium rate yw, where y > 1. z represents quasi-fixed labour costs, in 
other words those fringe costs that are independent of hours worked, imputed on a 
per period basis (typically they represent hiring and firing costs). 
30 The isocost contour in (N, H) space comprises two convex segments which form a 
kink at H = H, for example A0B0D0 in Fig. 3. The firm’s strictly concave revenue 
function is denoted by OR(H, N), where O is a demand shock. 
The firm chooses H and N to maximize II . OR(H, N) — C, where C is given 
by (1) if H = H and (2) if H > H. In general, the profit-maximizing solutions are 35 
written: 
H = H 
N = N1(w/O, H, z/O) 
Iif H = H (3) 
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If H2(w=O; H; z=O) = H, then the firm operates on the kink and all its employees 
work the standard workweek. Firms with H = H are hereafter labelled ‘standard- 
5 time firms’. Otherwise, if 
H2(w=°; H; z=O) > H; (5) 
then the firm operates on the upper segment and all its employees work overtime. 
These firms are hereafter labelled ‘overtime firms’. The two possible solutions (or 
‘working-time regimes’) are drawn in Fig. 3. Consider the kinked solid isocost 
10 curve A0B0D0. There are two possible iso-revenue maps, and we draw just one iso-
revenue curve for each map and hence illustrate the profit-maximizing outcome for 
the two regimes. These are points B0 for standard-time firms and C0 for overtime 
firms, respectively. The dotted lines illustrate how the isocost schedule shifts as H 
increases. Even though N1( ) and N2( ) have the same arguments, they 
15 are different functions. In particular, the effect of standard hours on employment 
varies between overtime and standard-time firms. 
3.1.1 Overtime firms For a firm to optimally offer overtime to all its employees, eq. 
(5) suggests that it must face relatively low standard hours. The demand for 
employment and hours functions are given by eq. (4), whose properties 
20 depend in part on the underlying technology generating the revenue function OR(H; 
N). 
Consider an increase in standard hours, H. In Fig. 3, this is from H0 to H1, and the 
new dotted isocost contour becomes A1B1D1. For given output, the marginal cost of 
an employee (the so-called extensive margin) falls but the marginal cost of 
25 an overtime hour (the intensive margin) remains constant, and so the firm substitutes 
away from hours towards employment (C0 to C1 in Fig. 3). Allowing output to vary, 
there is an additional scale effect, for example from C1 to C2, whereby the firm 
demands more hours and employees, because costs have fallen. Recall that this is 
exactly the motivation for German firms increasing standard hours in the early 
30 2000s. The overall effect of a increase in standard hours on employment is unam-
biguously positive (NH > 0). The firm reduces expensive overtime as the workweek 
is increased. 
3.1.2 Standard-time firms If it is optimal for the firm to operate at the kink, 
effectively employment is chosen conditional on the exogenously determined 35 
workweek, H = H. The firm’s problem can be more simply stated as 
 
max 
N 
OR(H; N) — (wH + z)N: (6) 
 
This generates the labour demand eq. (3). The variables that enter are the same as 
for the overtime regime (see eq. 4); it is the comparative static effects that are 
different. It is clear from eq. (6) that H is a price of employment, in direct 
)N = N2(w=~; H; z=) 
H2(w=°;H;z=0) H =  
if H > H: (4) 
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N 
 
¯
H0 H1 
Fig. 3 Substitution and scale effects of an increase in standard hours. An increase 
in H moves the isocost line from A0B0D0
 to
 A1B1D1. The substitution effect moves 
standard-time firms from B0 to B1 (along the same iso-revenue curve) and overtime 
firms from C0 to C1 (along the same iso-revenue curve). The scale effects are B1 to 
B2 and C1 to C2 and are positive for both types of firm. 
contrast to the overtime model. Just like an increase in the wage, an increase in H 
increases the marginal cost of an extra employee. On its own this decreases 
employee demand. However an increase in H also affects marginal revenue; only if 
the cross-partial is sufficiently positive—in other words if marginal revenue 
5 increases by more than marginal cost—does employment actually increase. 
Figure 3 illustrates the pure substitution effect of an increase in standard hours 
from H0 to H1, which moves standard-time firms from B0 to B1, reducing N. The 
scale effect moves the solution above B1 (for example to B2), which illustrates the 
ambiguity in the partial derivative. Overall, negative employment effects from 
10 increasing standard hours (8N/8H < 0) will be observed for standard-time firms 
providing the substitution effect dominates. 
Whether increasing standard hours reduces employment therefore depends on the 
extent to which firms offer overtime. Clearly, it is essential to distinguish between 
firms that offer overtime and those that do not and examine whether 
15 8N/8H varies with the firm’s working-time regime. We discuss the prevalence of 
overtime firms in the context of our data in Section 4. 
3.2 Negotiating over standard hours and wages  
It is important to model employment and standard hours outcomes in the presence 
of bargaining, especially because the initial drive for longer standard hours 
 
2 B 
0 B 
B 1 
isorevenue 
C 2  
C 1  
C0 
D 0  
D 1  
A 0  
A 1  
isocost 
H 
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happened in larger well-known firms where workforces were unionized. To do this, 
there are well-developed union-firm bargaining models that analyse how standard 
hours are negotiated; see Booth (1995) and Andrews and Simmons (2001) and 
references within. These models are still relevant even when firms do not explicitly 
5 bargain with a union.  
A key assumption in the literature is that standard hours and wage negotiations 
occur less frequently than changes in employment and hours. This is the 
assumption that firms ‘retain the right-to-manage’. Once standard hours and the 
hourly wage have been determined in the outcome of a bargain, effectively both 
10 variables are ‘exogenous’ for employment and hours, which means that the trad-
itional hours demand model is appropriate. 
In a typical union-firm bargaining model, a Nash bargain is set up with both the 
firm’s profit function and the union’s utility function having standard hours H and 
the hourly wage rate w as the variables negotiated over. If the relative power of the 
15 firm increases, the outcome of the negotiation may involve a lower hourly wage w—
so-called wage concession—as well as the increase in standard hours H being 
modelled here. To see the effect of possible wage concession on profits, first 
consider a standard-time firm. The effect of standard hours and the wage rate on 
profits H is given by 
H = H(H; wH); 
20 where H1 = RH > 0, H2 = —N < 0 (Hotelling’s lemma). If the worker’s weekly 
income Y wH remains constant—because the fall in the hourly wage offsets the 
longer working week—than the firm is unambiguously better off (as H1 = RH > 0). 
This also means that per worker utility is unambiguously lower, 
25 because both weekly income is constant and leisure has fallen. This is because per 
worker utility is written 0(wH; —H), with both arguments having positive marginal 
effects.
10
 
For workers in overtime firms, the effect of wage concessions is even stronger. In 
this case, a worker’s weekly income (the same as the firm’s per worker costs apart 30 
from z) is given by 
Y w[YH(H; :) — (11 — 1)H)]: (7) 
If HH < 0, the expression inside [] falls when H increases which, in contrast to 
standard-time workers, reinforces the fall in per worker weekly income. 
To summarize, the main focus of our empirical analysis is to examine whether 35 
employment does indeed increase, after stratifying by overtime and standard-time 
firms. However, this last section shows that we also need to examine what happens to 
per worker weekly labour costs in the same plants. 
10 If the negotiations involve trade unions, whose utility depends on adding up all its members utilities, 
there might be a partial offset in total union utility if there are more jobs. 
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4 Data description 
There are two data sources. The first is the IAB Establishment Panel, an annual 
survey of approximately 10,000 plants located in the former West Germany and an 
additional 5,500 plants in the former East Germany. The survey started in 1993 and 
5 is ongoing. It covers 1% of all plants and 7% of all employment in Germany, and is 
therefore a sample weighted towards larger plants. Information is obtained by 
personal interviews with plant managers, and comprises about 80 questions per 
year, giving information on, for example, total employment, bargaining arrange-
ments, standard hours, total sales, exports, investment, wage bill, location, industry, 
10 profit level, and nationality of ownership. A detailed description of the IAB 
Establishment Panel can be found in Fischer et al. (2009). 
The second source of data is the employment statistics register of the German 
Federal Employment Agency; this so-called Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik covers all workers 
or trainees registered by the social insurance system. The register covers about 80% 
15 of workers in Western Germany and about 85% in Eastern Germany. Information on 
workers includes basic demographics, start and end dates of employment spells, 
occupation and industry, earnings, qualifications (school and post-school), and a 
plant identification number. A detailed description of the employment data can be 
found in Bender et al. (2000). 
20  From the IAB Establishment Panel, we construct a balanced panel of private- 
sector plants, indexed j, observed annually on 30 June for 2001,. . . , 2006 (hereafter t 
= 1,.. ., 6). By using the plant identification number in the Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik, we 
link each worker to a plant in the panel, selecting all workers who were employed by 
the surveyed plants on 30 June each year. Because almost all 
25 workers in the private sector are covered by the social insurance system, the data 
cover nearly 100% of workers. From this, we compute the stock of employees Njt. 
We can also compute hires hjt and separations sjt for plant j between 30 June in year t 
– 1 and 30 June year t.11 When normalized by Njt ~ ðNj,t_1 þ NjtÞ/2, these three 
variables are linked as follows: 
 
30 Thus we are able to estimate models for employment, the employment growth 
rate, the hiring rate, and the separation rate. The fact that the increase in 
standard hours often included employment guarantees means that plants may 
adjust employment on the hiring rather than the separation margin. Finally, we 
35 construct two measures of each plant’s labour costs. The first is the plant’s per worker 
total wage bill and proxies the variable Y in Section 3.2. The second is the same, 
but averaged over all full-time employees in the plant in 2001 and who 
11 To be precise, hjt is the sum of all workers who were not employed by plant j in t – 1, but were 
employed by plant j in t. Conversely, sjt is the sum of all workers who were employed by plant j in t – 1, 
but were not employed by plant j in t. 
s jt 
t 1/4 2,...,6. 
hjt 
1/4 
N jt 
~N j t  
N j t  N j t  
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remain in the plant for the rest of the sample period. These employees are labelled 
‘incumbents’. 
The definition of standard hours Hjt in the JAB Establishment Panel is “How long 
is the agreed average standard working time for full-time workers in your 
5 plant?”and the variable is observed in 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2006.12 The question was 
not asked in 2003 and 2005. There are large variations in standard hours across 
plants in Western Germany. Using employment weights from the JAB 
Establishment Panel, we find that for 10% of plants, standard hours are less than 35; 
for 45% of plants, they are between 37.5 and 38.5 hours; and for the remaining 
10 25%, standard hours exceed 40. There is less dispersion in Eastern Germany. To 
identify the models we estimate, it is not variations in standard hours that we need 
but variations in its change. Standard hours for some plants have changed: of 
11,898 plants in the JAB Establishment Panel in 2004, 1,066 increased their 
standard hours between 2002 and 2004. A subset of these plants form the 
15 control and treatment groups we use in the subsequent analysis. The control group (Tj 
= 0) consists of all plants where H is constant in 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2006. The 
treatment group (Tj = 1) consists of all plants where standard hours are constant in 
2001 and 2002; go up between 2002 and 2004; and are constant again in 2004 and 
2006. 
20  We use a balanced panel because we need to observe hours of work in 2001, 
2002, 2004, and 2006. Although this reduces the sample to 603 treated plants, this 
restriction greatly reduces the possibility that the observed increase in standard 
hours is due to measurement error. However, there is a possible selection bias in 
that plants who are included in the balanced panel are less likely to have suffered 
25 large, negative idiosyncratic shocks. This is discussed later. We then exclude plants for 
which we do not have complete information in each year. This reduces the treated 
sample to 111 plants. The control group comprises 1,908 plants which have constant 
standard hours for all years. Figure 4 illustrates, where the averages for H are 
computed from the regression sample. We label 2001 and 2002 as ‘before’ and 
30 2005 and 2006 as ‘after’. We chose this six-year period because most increases in 
standard hours took place in 2003 and 2004.
13
 
The dummy variable Vjt records whether a plant used overtime in a given year. The 
data actually record whether overtime is (a) ‘paid for’; (b) ‘partly paid for, partly 
compensated by time off’; (c) ‘only compensated by time off’; or (d) ‘neither 
35 paid for nor compensated by time off’, and is observed in 2001, 2002, and 2006.14 
Because the crucial aspect of an overtime hour is whether it is paid a premium 
12 The word ‘average’ allows for some short-run variations in standard hours allowed for in some 
bargaining agreements providing the annual average matches that agreed. 
13 Note that plants in the control group have higher standard hours on average than the treated plants 
before treatment. This is probably because it is easier for employers to increase standard hours when 
they have been lower than the current average level. 
14 The question asked in 2004 is not consistent with those in 2001, 2002, and 2006 and cannot be used. 
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Fig. 4 Average standard hours for plants in the treatment group (Tj= 1) and control 
group (Tj = 0). There are 111 plants in the treatment group that have constant 
hours between 2001 and 2002 (average = 37.7 and between 2004 and 2006 
(average = 39.4) and increase hours between 2002 and 2004. There are 1,908 
plants in the control group that have constant hours between 2001 and 2006 
(average = 39.1). Standard hours are not observed in 2003 and 2005. 
(the theory relies on y > 1), we define Vjt = 1 only if (a) or (b) apply.15 It is fixed at 
its 2001 value, but we examine what happens to the subset of plants where V 
changes in 2006 by dropping them from our basic model, to examine whether our 
results are robust to this change. The theory outlined in Section 3 suggests 
5 that as standard hours increase, some plants will no longer offer overtime.
16
 
Throughout we stratify by the dummy variable Vj1, creating sub-samples of standard 
time and overtime plants. 
5. Econometric methodology 
Our methodology is a standard application of the DiD estimator for treatment 10 
effects, using both regression and propensity score matching. The DiD framework 
allows for the fact that plants that expanded their standard hours are unobservably 
different from plants that did not, provided these differences already existed before 
15 Only 15% of workers in Germany were paid overtime in 2006 (IAB Establishment Panel), and 
16.1% of (weighted) plants are ‘overtime plants’ in the same year. 
16 Of 414 plants that changed their overtime status, 240 changed from standard-time to overtime and 
174 went the other way. 
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2002 and are permanent. We explained in the introduction that there are two key 
identifying assumptions that allow us to interpret our results as a causal impact of 
standard hours on employment. First, that unobserved demand shocks are not 
correlated with Tj, and second that employment trends would have been the 
5 same in Tj= 1 and Tj= 0 plants in the absence of treatment.  
Our basic estimating equation for employment is as follows: 
6  6  
 logNjt 1/4 y0 þ X XSkDkt þ ykDktTj þ xj 3 þ lTj þ ujt, t 1/4 1, . . 
. , 6. ð8Þ 
 k1/42 k1/42 
Tj is the treatment dummy, Dkt is a time-dummy for year k, and xj is a vector of 
observed covariates, held constant at their 2001 values. The selection effect is A, 
10 which captures any differences in employment outcomes between treated and control 
plants before the treatment takes place, including any permanent difference in 
demand between the two groups. One can either estimate eq.(8) by OLS, or one 
can allow for plant-specific fixed effects Oj, in which case the estimating equation 
is 
 6 6 
 logNjt 1/4 y0 þ X XSkDkt þ ykDktTj þ Oj þ ujt, t 1/4 1, . . . , 6.
 ð9Þ 
k1/42 k1/42 
15 The Oj can be removed with either fixed effects (FE) or first differenced (FD) 
estimators. With time-invariant covariates, as here, the estimates of yk are 
identical.
17
 We report plant-level cluster-robust standard errors, which takes 
account of any serial correlation in the ujt for a given plant as well as 
20 heteroskedsticity in the ujt across plants. The number of plants/clusters is suffi-
ciently large, there being roughly 1,000 plants in the overtime and standard 
time sub-samples. The same basic DiD framework is used when analysing per 
worker weekly labour costs. Within the same DiD framework, an alternative 
approach to control for observable differences between the treated and control  
25 plants is to assess whether there are any pre-existing differences in xj between the 
treated and control plants and then explicitly match on values of xj. When 
interpreting the parameters, first consider the OLS estimate of y2 in the absence of 
covariates: 
Y2 1/4 ðlogNT2 logNT1 Þ ~ ðlogNC2 — logNC1 Þ. 
30 The superscript T denotes ‘treated’ and C denotes ‘control’. y2 should be 0 if the 
common trends assumption holds, because periods 1 and 2 are before the treatment 
occurs. Next, y5 and y6 are the two treatment effects (DiD) of interest, correspond-
ing to 2005 and 2006, the two years in the data after the change in H. It is clear that 
P6 1/4 ðlogNT6 — logNT1 Þ — ðlogNC6 — logNC1 Þ 
17 We include xj in eq. (8) because this may improve the precision of the estimates. 
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compares 2006 with 2001. However, under common trends, ^6 also compares 2006 
with 2002. The same argument applies to ^5. Finally, we can also write 
 
 
6 
X 
t1/42 
h    i 
ð~Nt=Nt ÞT ~ ð~Nt=Nt ÞC : 
 
5 Thus, this particular DiD is written as the approximate sum of five differentials— 
between treated and control plants—in the employment growth rates. Because we 
need to control for observables, these are actually estimated from: 
 
The five differentials are V2, 
. . . , 
0
 6. 
10  There are analogous regression models for sjt=Njt
 and
 hjt=Njt. From these, we 
can decompose the differentials in the employment growth rates into differentials 
for hires and separations: 
 6 h    i X6 
ðht=Nt ÞT ~ ðht=Nt ÞC ~ 
t1/42 t1/42 
 h     i 
ðst=Nt ÞT ~ ðst=NtÞC : ð11Þ 
Finally, we examine the potential selection issues that arise because plants are 
15 necessarily observed six times. Plants who are included in the balanced panel are less 
likely to have suffered large, negative idiosyncratic shocks. We follow Wooldridge 
(2010, Section 19.9.1) and examine the larger data set (i.e. the IAB Establishment 
Panel) from which the balanced panel was constructed. We define a dummy sj 1/4 
1 if a plant is in the balanced panel and sj 1/4 0 otherwise. We then 
20 estimate the following model using fixed effects: 
6  6  
 logNjt 1/4 y0 þ X X~kDk t þ PkDktsj þ ~j þ ujt; t 1/4 1; . . . ; 6: 
k1/42 k1/41 
We normalize p2 1/4 0 (2002) and then test H0 : p5 1/4 p6 1/4 0. If either p5 or p6 
were positive, it means that the growth of employment between 2002 and 2005/6, con-
ditional on unobserved characteristics, is higher in the plants that have been 
25 included in the estimation sample compared with those that were not. It turns out that 
this test is not rejected, for both standard-time plants and overtime plants. The 
estimate for 2005 is 0.0221 (0.0131) and for 2006 it is 0.0092 (0.0145) for standard 
time plants (joint test p-value = 0.111). For overtime plants, the corresponding 
estimates are 0.0112 (0.0124) and —0.0003 (0.0148), with a joint test p- 
30 value = 0.504.
18
 This confirms that we do not have such selection issues in our data. 
6 
X 6^ 1/4 
t1/42 
hiðlogNTt logNTt 1Þ ðlogNCt — logNC t~1Þ 
 
 
AN j t  
N j t  
6 
X1/4 
k1/42 
6 
X 
0 kDk t þ 
k1/42 
~0 kDk t Tj þxji3 þ ejt t 1/4 2; ... ; 6: ð10Þ 
 
X^ Y6& 
18 If one adds standard hours to the estimation, one loses the estimates for 2003 and 2005. It turns out that nothing 
changes when we do this. 
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6. Results 
Our basic employment estimates and their decomposition into hires and separations 
are presented in the first section below, followed by various departures from the basic 
results in second subsection. Finally, we analyse per worker weekly labour costs. 
5  6 .1  E mp l o y me n t  
The sample comprises a balanced panel of 1,112 standard-time plants (68 treated 
and 1,044 control) and 907 overtime plants (43 treated and 864 control), making a 
total sample size of 2,019 plants. 
For propensity score matching, we need to assess whether there is overlap 10 
between the treated and control plants. We follow Imbens and Rubin (2014), who 
suggest computing the following normalized difference in sample means for any 
covariate x: 
p fifififififififififififififififififififfi , 
S2,T 
x  + S 2 , C  
x 
where xw is the sample average of the covariate of interest for group w, and Sw x is the 15 
sample standard deviation, with w e {T, C}. Imbens and Rubin suggest that if the 
difference in means is bigger than 0.25 standard deviations (izi > 0.25), then linear 
regression methods may be problematic. 
Table 1 shows that there are some significant differences in sample means 
between treated and control plants. The most important of these is that treated 
20 plants are less likely to be in Eastern Germany: for standard-time plants, 63% of 
control plants—but only 25% of treated plants—are in Eastern Germany. There is a 
similar difference (47% and 12%, respectively) in overtime plants. For the same 
reason, the regional unemployment rate is significantly higher in control plants. 
Given the earlier discussion on whether firms bargain with unions, and whether 
25 this has an impact on whether a plant is treated, note that amongst standard-time 
plants, a significantly larger share of treated plants had some collective bargaining 
(43% of treated compared to 62% of control plants had no collective agreement). 
The difference for overtime plants is very small (z = 0.027). 
Overall there are only a few significant differences, and therefore it is not  
30 surprising that it makes no difference to our results below whether we use standard 
linear regression or propensity score matching. In what follows, we report and 
discuss the regression results; the propensity score matching results are reported in 
the Online Appendix. 
Our results for employment are reported in Table 2. The raw DiDs are given in 
35 the third column, which are exactly the same when covariates are added, reported in 
the fourth column. (These are all the variables listed in Table 1 plus sector 
dummies.) For standard-time plants, the DiD for 2005 is —0.030 (0.052), and for 
2006 it is 0.009 (0.059). For overtime plants, these estimates are much bigger: 
0.113 (0.064) for 2005 and 0.158 (0.070) for 2006. 
z  =  
~xT — ~xC 
(12) 
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Table 1 Unweighted sample means, pre-treatment (2001) 
 
Variable Standard-time plants 
"H > 0? 
yes no z 
Overtime plants 
"H > 0? 
yes no z 
Employment (N) 43.03 62.60 -0.09 1414 254.05 0.14 
Standard-time (H) 37.79 39.47 -0.81 37.44 38.67 -0.46 
Hiring rate 0.126 0.179 -0.20 0.158 0.148 0.04 
Separation rate 0.188 0.187 0.00 0.128 0.153 -0.14 
Share of female employees 0.429 0.415 0.03 0.265 0.304 -0.12 
Share of part-time employees 0.213 0.167 0.15 0.091 0.108 -0.08 
Share of vacancies 0.007 0.018 -0.06 0.011 0.011 -0.00 
Export share in total sales 0.023 0.046 -0.14 0.166 0.138 0.08 
Very good or good profitability 0.324 0.324 -0.00 0.349 0.384 -0.05 
No collective agreement 0.426 0.620 -0.28 0.442 0.422 0.03 
Sector-level bargaining 0.500 0.327 0.25 0.442 0.465 -0.03 
Firm-level bargaining 0.074 0.054 0.08 0.116 0.112 0.01 
Works council 0.206 0.152 0.10 0.442 0.466 -0.03 
Located Eastern Germany 0.250 0.629 -0.58 0.116 0.468 -0.59 
Regional unemployment rate 0.106 0.134 -0.41 0.086 0.122 -0.55 
Number of observations 68 1,044  43 864   
Notes: The sample is exactly that used in the regressions. The z-statistic for testing equality of 
means is defined in eq. (12). 
Figure 5 plots these estimated conditional differentials for hires, separations, 
employment growth, and employment for both plant types. A comparison of the 
fourth panel in Fig. 5 between standard-time and overtime plants shows that for 
overtime plants, employment increases for the treatment group and reduces slightly 
5 for the control group, whilst for standard-time plants employment reduces for both 
groups. 
The ‘post-treatment’ period is defined to be 2005 and 2006. However, the 
estimate of y4 for 2004 in the bottom panel of Table 2 is also positive and signifi-
cant (0.102 with a standard error of 0.053). This is also clear from Fig. 5, which 
10 shows an increase in employment in overtime plants occurring in 2004. But in fact, this 
is perfectly consistent with our results for 2005 and 2006, because some plants will 
have changed standard hours at some point between 30 June 2002 and 30 June 30t 
2004—we do not observe when—and the subsequent increase in employment will 
have occurred between these two dates. For similar reasons, the same will have 
15 happened between 30 June 2002 and 30 June 2003, but the number of plants doing 
this will be smaller. 
As already discussed, testing the common trends assumption amounts to seeing 
whether the DiD estimates for 2002 in both regressions are insignificant, which they 
are (t-statistics of 0.3 and 0.3, respectively.) This is also seen when comparing the 
20 fourth panels in Fig. 5. Employment in standard-time plants fell at the same rate over 
the whole sample period, including the pre-treatment period. Employment in 
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Table 2 Difference-in-difference employment estimates, standard-time and 
overtime plants separately 
 
Raw differential 
 logN C logNT 
 t t 
DiDa 
Conditional 
logNb 
differential 
"Njt c hjt 
N 
jt 
sjt 
Njt N jt 
A: 1,112 standard-time plants (68 treated) 
2001 2.667 2.491 
    
2002 2.643 2.473 0.006 0.006 0.014 –0.018 –0.031 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
2003 2.635 2.410 –0.048 –0.048 –0.046 –0.051 –0.005 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.020) (0.026) 
2004 2.628 2.432 –0.020 –0.020 0.030 0.069 0.039 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.037) (0.033) (0.028) 
2005 2.594 2.389 –0.030 –0.030 0.007 –0.001 –0.007 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.036) (0.021) (0.032) 
2006 2.546 2.380 0.009 0.009 0.042 0.003 –0.039 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026) 
Sum
d
   0.047 0.002 –0.043 
No. obs. 6,672 6,672 6,672 6,672 5,560 5,560 5,560 
B: 907 overtime plants (43 treated)      
2001 4.205 4.409      
2002 4.185 4.398 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.018 0.009 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.022) (0.022) 
2003 4.180 4.429 0.046 0.046 0.035 0.011 –0.023 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.026) (0.022) (0.014) 
2004 4.173 4.479 0.102 0.102 0.055 0.044 –0.011 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.029) (0.027) (0.017) 
2005 4.141 4.458 0.113 0.113 0.010 0.030 0.020 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.034) (0.023) (0.026) 
2006 4.096 4.457 0.158 0.158 0.038 0.009 –0.029 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) 
Sum
d
   0.148 0.112 –0.034 
No. obs. 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 4,535 4,535 4,535 
 
aRaw DiD differential is defined as ðlogNT t - logNT 1 Þ - ðlogN C t - logN C 1 Þ. 
bConditional DiD differential for logN is given by Yk in eq. (9). 
cDifferential on ANjt/Njt is given by y0 k in eq. (10), which decomposes into hires and 
separations. dSum of employment change over 2002.. .2006; see eq. (11). 
overtime plants has the same trend for both groups in the pre-treatment period; 
treatment plants did not increase employment until after 2002. 
Our identifying assumptions (no correlation of unobserved demand shocks with 
the treatment; common trends) allow us to interpret our estimates as causal, and 
5 the results match the theory exactly. Those overtime plants who increase standard 
hours increase their employment more than observably similar plants who did not 
increase standard hours. This does not happen in standard-time plants. For 
standard-time plants, the zero estimate implies that the scale and substitution 
effects cancel each other out; for overtime plants, both scale and substitution 
10 effects mean higher employment. See Fig. 3. 
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Standard−time plants 
Overtime plants 
Hbar constant Hbar increases 
 
Fig. 5 Employment, hiring, and separation effects of an increase in standard hours 
for standard-time and overtime plants separately. Estimates are from the condi-
tional DiD model reported in Table 2. 
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For overtime plants, the effect is economically significant. An increase of H by 1.57 
hours (see Fig. 4) represents a 4.17% increase (1.57 / 37.66 = 4.17%), which leads to a 
0.113 log-point increase in employment: an elasticity of 0.113 / 4.17 = 2.7. 
Alternatively, if we define the DiD as (0.113 + 0.158) / 2 = 0.136, then the estimates 
5 are slightly bigger. Whilst these treatment effects are large, the 95% confidence 
interval obviously contains smaller (perhaps more plausible) elasticities. 
We noted in Section 2 that some agreements to increase standard hours included 
employment guarantees for existing workers, meaning that reductions in 
employment could only be implemented by hiring fewer workers. As our results 
10 show that the employment effect of increasing standard hours was zero in standard-
time plants and positive in overtime plants, this is no longer an issue. Nonetheless, 
it is interesting to examine what happens to hires and separations. The final three 
columns of Table 2 report the employment growth rate(~Njt 
Njt ) and its 
component hiring and separation rates. Recall that, from eq. (11), the DiD 
15 estimate of Yt is approximately equal to the sum of employment growth between year t 
and 2001, which itself is equal to the sum of the difference between hiring and 
separation rates. These rates are also plotted in the first three panels of Fig. 5 for 
both standard-time and overtime plants. For standard-time plants, the difference in 
employment growth rates between treated and untreated plants is close to zero, and 
20 there is no additional differential effects for either hires or separations.  
For overtime plants, the differential in employment growth rates between treated 
and control plants is 0.148. As one can see from eq. (11), this is approximately the 
same as the estimate of Y6 1/4 0.158 in the preceding column. The sum of 
employment growth (0.148) decomposes into 0.112 for hires and —0.034 for sep- 
25 arations. Thus, for overtime plants, the increased employment in treated relative to 
control plants is due to increased hires rather than fewer separations. This is exactly 
what would be expected in plants that are expanding (Bellmann et al., 2011).
19
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the effect on the separation rate with that of the 
earlier studies that examined the effects of work sharing (reductions in standard 
30 hours), although, as we have noted, there is no reason to assume symmetry. For 
example, when looking at state-mandated cuts in standard hours in France in 1981, 
Crépon and Kramarz (2002), who used the French Labour Force Survey, found that 
the separation rate increased by 2 to 4 percentage points in response to a cut in hours 
from 40 to 39 in 1981. The 95% CI for our estimate, (—0.054, —0.014), is 
35 similar. In our analysis, the average increase in standard hours is 1.5 hours, and it is 
the hiring rate that changes, not the separation rate, something studies using 
worker-level data cannot infer. This demonstrates a key advantage of using plant-
level rather than worker-level data. 
19 Recall that the definition of whether a plant is standard-time or overtime is fixed at its 2001 value, 
because we need a balanced panel for estimating DiD effects. Our results are robust to the exclusion of 
plants whose overtime status changes in 2006; again, we find a zero-employment effect for standard-
time plants and a positive effect for overtime plants (where the average DiD effect for 2005/6 is equal to 
0.111 (0.046)). Results are available on request. 
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6.2 Departures 
In this section, we examine what happens to our basic DiD estimate when we 
stratify its effect in various directions. By way of example, it is interesting to see 
whether it makes a difference whether the plant is located in Western or Eastern 
5 Germany. We also stratify by whether there is a bargaining agreement and possible 
employment guarantee in the plant, we examine the effects of whether overtime 
plants have a small or large proportion of overtime workers, and we examine the 
effect of temporary contracts. 
Our results are reported in Table 3. The first row simply summarizes our earlier 
10 results from Table 2, where for simplicity we focus on 2006 only. 
In the next row, we run separate regressions for Western and Eastern Germany. If 
we look at overtime plants, the ‘basic’ result above of 0.158 splits out into 0.126 for 
Western German plants and 0.452 for Eastern German plants. The latter is very 
imprecisely estimated because there are only five treated plants, so the difference 
15 between 0.126 and 0.452 is insignificant. 
However, when we stratify plants by whether there is a bargaining agreement in 
place, for overtime plants, the positive effect of 0.158 comes solely from the plants 
that apply a bargaining agreement, that is, 0.275. This does seem somewhat at odds 
with the view that increasingly powerful firms drive the increase in standard hours, 
20 but of course, unions are better off if there are more jobs for their members. The change 
in employment comes about through more hires and fewer separations. There is no 
effect for standard time plants. The data also record whether a plant has an 
employment guarantee (or ‘Bündnisse für Arbeit’; see Section 2). However, these 
total just six treated plants (three of each type), so we do not learn anything from 
25 stratifying the regressions accordingly (which are therefore not reported in the 
table). 
We now examine whether plants with proportionally more workers on temporary 
contracts are more easily able to increase employment compared with plants with 
proportionally more permanent workers. We stratify the sample into 
30 plants with some workers on fixed-term contracts and those with none. The results go 
in opposite directions, with standard-time plants being more flexible with more 
temporary workers (as expected). It is the opposite for overtime plants. However, 
in both cases, the differences are insignificant. 
Finally, we examine whether the proportion of workers doing overtime within a 
35 plant has the same effect on employment as comparing overtime between plants. By 
construction, we can only do this for overtime plants. It turns out that the (positive) 
employment effect is bigger if the firm has fewer employees working overtime: the 
‘basic’ result of 0.158 splits out to 0.235 if the share of overtime workers is less than 
one-half and 0.075 otherwise. Again, the difference is not significant. 
40  To conclude this section, the number of treated plants is relatively small, which 
means that stratifying the data again delivers imprecise estimates. The one strong 
finding is that it is overtime plants with bargaining agreements where jobs are 
created. 
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6.3 Labour costs 
In this subsection, we report what happens when we repeat our DiD estimations, 
but with the plant’s labour costs as the dependent variable. We construct two 
versions: (i) the weekly cost of employing each full-time worker, averaged for 
5 each plant, and (ii) the same, but only averaging across full-time workers who remain 
in the plants throughout the six years. The latter we label as ‘incumbents’ in Table 
4. We do this to control for hires and separations over the six years and to control 
for any compositional changes in a plant’s workforce—such as gender 
composition, whether full-time or part-time, and so on—so that we get a cleaner 
10 measure of the cost of employing each worker. 
The results show very clear evidence of wage concession. Irrespective of which 
method or plant type, weekly labour costs are unaffected by whether they are 
treated. Because standard hours H have increased for treated standard-time plants, 
this means that the hourly wage rate w must have fallen in these plants. 
15 To see whether the wage rate has gone up or down in overtime plants, differentiate eq. 
(7) and set dY= 0, giving: 
[ 
= -sgn yHH - (y - 1)]. 
Empirical evidence convincingly suggests that HH 
0.8 (Andrews and Simmons, 2001) and y is often said to be 1.5 (so-called time-
and-half), and so dw  
dH < 0. In 
20 other words, our regressions imply that there is wage concession in overtime plants as 
well standard-time plants. 
In terms of the theory, for standard-time plants and their workers, the outcome is 
clear (Section 3.2). wH is the same for both treated and untreated plants, so profits 
for treated plants must have increased and at the same time per worker 
25 utility fell for their employees. This is perfectly consistent with the idea that German 
firms became more powerful in the sample period. The same basic story happens in 
overtime plants, but it is a bit more complicated as plants choose hours as well as 
employment. However, in these plants, we know that more union members have 
jobs, which partially offsets the fall in per worker utility. 
30 7. Conclusion 
In this article we estimate the effect of increasing standard hours on employment in 
Germany in the early 2000s. During this period many firms were able to negotiate 
increases in standard hours, including several prominent examples. This was and 
remains a contentious policy issue. Proponents of increased working time argue that 
35 it allows firms to increase competitiveness and hence protect jobs. Others disagree 
and argue that firms will substitute hours for jobs. This article is the first to provide 
econometric evidence on the employment effects of increasing standard hours. The 
increase in standard hours reversed earlier trends of working time reductions in 
Germany and elsewhere in Europe (so-called work sharing). We argue that the 40 
policies of increasing and reducing standard working time are not necessarily 
d w  
d H  
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Table 4 Difference-in-difference estimates of plant-averaged per worker weekly 
labour costs, standard-time and overtime plants separately 
 
 Incumbents only 
logY C logYT 
 t t 
DiD
a
 
All 
logY C 
t 
logYT 
t 
DiD
a
 
A: 940 standard-time plants (58 treated)     
2001 4.018 4.108  3.595 3.576  
2002 4.042 4.129 –0.004 3.602 3.593 0.007 
   (0.006)   (0.021) 
2003 4.059 4.141 –0.010 3.609 3.622 0.026 
   (0.015)   (0.036) 
2004 4.062 4.147 –0.006 3.575 3.578 0.023 
   (0.019)   (0.051) 
2005 4.064 4.145 –0.010 3.566 3.579 0.029 
   (0.021)   (0.048) 
2006 4.073 4.156 –0.007 3.566 3.581 0.038 
   (0.022)   (0.049) 
No. obs. 5.634 348 5,982 6,264 408 6,672 
B: 847 overtime plants (43 treated)     
2001 4.281 4.444  3.988 4.163  
2002 4.305 4.472 0.003 4.007 4.218 0.029 
   (0.008)   (0.023) 
2003 4.328 4.507 0.015 4.018 4.199 0.000 
   (0.010)   (0.033) 
2004 4.337 4.517 0.017 4.018 4.191 –0.007 
   (0.010)   (0.037) 
2005 4.347 4.505 –0.007 4.018 4.184 –0.008 
   (0.016)   (0.035) 
2006 4.362 4.523 –0.003 4.038 4.198 –0.013 
   (0.017)   (0.037) 
No. obs. 5,082 258 5,340 5,184 258 5,442 
 
Notes: See Table 2, notes a and b. DiDs are conditional, with same covariates as for employment 
regressions. ‘Incumbents only’ means that plant averaging only includes those full-time workers 
employed in all six years. 
symmetric. Thus, earlier evidence on the effects of work sharing—which generally 
concluded that work sharing does not lead to employment increases and may even 
reduce employment—cannot necessarily be used to infer the employment effects of 
increased hours. This asymmetry is most likely to be relevant if negotiations over 
5 working time also include—in the case of working time reductions—wage com-
pensation or—in the case of working time extensions—wage concessions. 
Using a panel of German plants observed between 2001 and 2006, we investigate 
whether there was any significant change in employment for those plants where 
standard hours increased between 2002 and 2004, relative to a control group of 
10 plants that did not increase standard hours. We link this panel of plants to worker-
level information, which enables us to examine whether workers in the treatment 
group experienced falls in hourly wages as their hours were increased. The use of 
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worker-level information also allows us to decompose changes in employment into hires 
and separations. This sheds light on whether negotiations over hours included 
employment guarantees which precluded layoffs. 
We outline an established theoretical model which shows that we should expect a 
5 different impact on employment in plants that offer overtime and those that do not. 
Our results are consistent with the predictions of this model. Overtime plants that 
increased standard hours increased their employment significantly more than 
overtime plants that did not change standard hours. The effect is economically 
significant, with an elasticity of about 2.5. The increased employment in treated  
10 (relative to control) plants comes about due to increased hires rather than reduced 
separations, suggesting that the employment response was not merely the result of 
employment guarantees negotiated with the increased hours. For standard-time 
plants, there is no difference at all between plants that increase standard hours and 
those that did not. These results, for both types of plant, match the theory  
15 exactly, because for overtime plants scale and substitution effects of an increase in 
standard hours work in the same direction, whilst for standard-time plants they work in 
opposite directions. 
We then test whether the positive employment effect is at least partly the result of 
wage concessions. Our results show clear evidence of wage concessions, because 
20 there is no significant effect of the treatment on weekly labour costs, so hourly 
labour costs must have fallen in the treated plants relative to the control plants.  
The key issue in the interpretation of our results is that we identify the 
employment response from a change in standard hours which is negotiated by 
firms (as in Hunt, 1999) rather than imposed exogenously as a policy (as in  
25 Crépon and Kramarz, 2002). For our estimates to be interpreted as the causal impact 
of standard hours on employment, we require that plants do not respond to demand 
shocks by immediately increasing standard hours. This is likely to be the case 
because changes in standard hours typically require negotiation with workers or 
their representatives. Instead, the short-term response to changes in demand is 
30 to change employment or overtime. We also require that the employment trends of treated 
and control firms would have been the same in the absence of the change in hours. A 
comparison of pre-treatment trends supports this assumption. 
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Supplementary material is available online at the OUP website. 
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